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As political elites in the Caspian countries see themselves as actors who determine the fate
of their countries and not as mere objects of international power struggles or as managers
of pipeline projects, this contribution examines how domestic elites assess different
pipeline projects. Based on close to 1,500 TV reports from national TV stations, which are
seen as the mouthpiece of the ruling elites, we analyze the arguments surrounding oil and
gas pipeline debate and construction in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Although the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea
Basin are relatively small in global comparison, they are
considered of major geopolitical importance by external
powers, as they are not controlled by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or by the Russian
Federation. Therefore, they offer the United States (US), the
European Union (EU) and China the chance to diversify
their energy supplies. This opportunity has resulted in a
geopolitical struggle over control of Caspian oil and gas
production and transportation.
Accordingly, most existing publications on the topic
analyze the exports of crude oil and natural gas from therk of the international resea
ntation in Azerbaijan, Kazak
en, Germany, since 2011. The
ame.
.
earch Center, Hanyang Unive
nter, Hanyang University. ProdCaspian Sea region and the construction of export pipelines
from a purely geopolitical perspective; nearly all accounts
focus exclusively on the actions of big international players
and refer to Caspian country's foreign policy options and
preferences only in passing. Although the geopolitical
perspective provides important insights, it oversimpliﬁes
international relations in the region and neglects Caspian
countries as actors in their own right.
When Azerbaijan developed a more critical stance to-
wards Western projects in the debate on the Nabucco
pipeline and at the same time supported Georgia against
Russian pressure, the deﬁcit in the literature became
obvious. This foreign policymove could not be explained by
the increased inﬂuence of any one major outside power.rch project ‘Internal discourses and foreign policy-making in the Caspian
hstan and Turkmenistan’ which is being conducted by the Research Center
project has received ﬁnancial support from the Volkswagen Foundation,
rsity.
uction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Azerbaijan's foreign policy in its own right. Kjaernet comes
to the conclusion that ‘Azerbaijan has exploited its new
situation to position itself as an increasingly powerful and
independent actor in the South Caucasus. Due to its energy
independence, Azerbaijan has been able to do this without
suffering any reprisal from the Russian side’ (Kjaernet,
2010: 158). Similarly, Ismayilov (2010: 4) argues: ‘In an
open effort to further diversify its linkages with the outside
world and the ensuing dependencies and in-
terdependencies that come from them, Baku is now keen to
have its gas distributed among as many players in the re-
gion as possible, rather than limiting its exports to a single
(western) market’ (For a similar, but less pronounced
assessment see Ipek, 2009). Franke et al. argue that in its
policy towards the EU, Azerbaijan e conﬁdent of its po-
tential for the export of energy resources e ‘sees the EU on
the receiving end of bilateral relations’ (Franke, Gawrich,
Melnykovska, & Schweickert, 2010: 149). Similar studies
on foreign policy orientation have been conducted for
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (cf. e.g., Ipek, 2007;
Anceschi, 2008; Horak, 2012; Kubicek, 2013. An older
work on the countries under study is Kuzio, 2000).
In a similar vein, we argue that political elites in these
countries clearly perceive themselves as actors who
determine the fate of their countries and not merely as
objects in an international power struggle. These elites
discuss their export options not only in terms of economic
gains but also see their decisions on export pipelines as the
bases for strategic alliances with broader implications.
Thus, an analysis of their reasoning relating to speciﬁc
pipeline projects will help to provide a better under-
standing of their perceptions.
This article continues with a brief description of the
methodological approach. Then, a short overview of the
pipeline options available for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan and their public assessment by the ruling
elites of these countries is given. In the ﬁnal part of the
article, we present data on pipeline-related arguments and
their connection to actual pipeline projects in order to draw
some broader conclusions.
2. Methodological approach
The research project, on which this contribution is
based, examines pipeline-related debates in three Caspian
oil and gas states. It analyses mass media reporting on the
issue, including TV, mainstream print media, business
presses and news websites. The project also looks at
selected decision-making processes through process
tracing. In addition, interviews with relevant decision-
makers and journalists have been conducted.
The objective of the analysis presented here is to study
the arguments for and against speciﬁc pipeline projects or
export directions as they have been voiced by the ruling
elites of the three countries under study, i.e., Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and to put these arguments
into a broader context. The period covered in the analysis
commences from 1998, when the ﬁrst new pipeline project
started to gain momentum, until 2013, when decisions had
ﬁnally been made on all major pipeline projects.The ruling elite can be deﬁned as a complex aggregation
of powerful political, economic, and social actors, the inner
leadership of which is located in a country's government
and legislature (Higley & Pakulski, 2011: 951). Elite mem-
bers ‘are distinguished by their proximity to political
decision-making and ability to inﬂuence political outcomes
regularly and substantially’ (Higley, 2011: 829). Notably, the
composition of the ruling elites in the three countries
under study has not changed substantially during the
period under study (cf. e.g., Denison, 2012; Guliyev, 2012;
Umbetalieva & Satpayev, 2012).
This analysis focuses on public statements of the ruling
elites for two reasons. First, the (honest) private opinion of
elite members is rarely accessible to researchers. Second,
in order to understand political decision-making pro-
cesses, it is important to understand the ofﬁcial positions
of relevant actors, as these positions are used to legitimize
policies and, thus, shape the policy output. We, therefore,
think that in order to understand the rationales behind
foreign policy concerning export pipelines in Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, it is important to study
how the relevant decision-makers publicly justify their
decisions.
In order to establish the ofﬁcial view of the ruling elites,
this study focuses on TV reporting for a number of reasons.
First, as the issue of export pipelines is of major importance
for all three countries, TV reports offer continuous
coverage, whereas ofﬁcial statements are only released at
the rarer moments when important decisions are being
made, e.g., when a pipeline contract is being signed. Sec-
ond, as TV is the by far most important source of news for
the population in all three countries, political leadership
has established rather tight control. As a result, TV presents
only views accepted by the ruling elites, while e at least in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan e some print and internet
media side with the political opposition and present views
that are highly critical of the ruling elites (cf. e.g., Thomas,
2005; Freedman, Shafer, & Antonova, 2010; Anceschi,
2011; Junisbai, 2011; Kazimova, 2011; Freedman & Shafer,
2014).
The role of TV as the mouthpiece of the ruling elites is
conﬁrmed by our analysis. Out of a total of 954 quotes in TV
reports on export pipelines in the three countries under
study, not a single one is from an opposition politician,
while 65% of all pipeline-related quotes on Turkmenistan's
TV are from the country's president himself. In Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan, the share of presidential quotes is slightly
over 25%. The total share of ruling elites in pipeline-related
TV quotes amounts to some 75% in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan and 85% in Turkmenistan. The remaining
quotes are mainly from foreign politicians on the occasion
of ofﬁcial visits.
The analysis of TV reporting on export pipelines is based
on transcripts in an English translation provided by the BBC
Summaries of World Broadcasts database, as no other
source with such a broad coverage is available. Still, as the
BBC does not offer full coverage of TV reporting, the text
corpus does probably not contain all reports. However,
with a total of 1,479 pipeline-related reports, the corpus
provides a good impression of overall reporting patterns.
The TV stations included are Turkmenistan's state TV
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from Azerbaijan AzTV (Channel 1), ITV (Public TV), ANS,
ATV and Lider TV.1
Relevant texts were selected with the help of a search
function. The search term used was ‘pipeline’. All articles
with any meaningful reference to an oil or gas export
pipeline from the respective country have been included in
the text corpus. The reference to export pipelines did not
necessarily need to be in the headline; it may only consti-
tute one paragraph of the article. If the reference was very
marginal and did not relate to the issue of export pipelines,
the respective article was not included.
Codings used in this analysis are ‘pipelines mentioned’
together with ‘assessment of pipeline’ (positive, neutral or
negative), direct and indirect quotes and ‘frames’
describing major sets of arguments for or against speciﬁc
pipeline projects, such as, e.g., geopolitics or proﬁtability.
For all ‘frames’ mentioned in TV reports, it was established
with a separate sub-code whether the related arguments
were seen as having explanatory power. Frames that were
challenged in the speciﬁc TV report as lacking explanatory
power, i.e., as not being relevant for pipeline decisions,
were not included in this analysis.2
As the project was designed to move beyond mere
manifest content and to analyze arguments and assess-
ments, it is based on ‘interpretative coding’. Thus, it ‘puts
precedence with the coders judgments and believes that
the elements in the content are symbols that require
viewers to access their pre-existingmental scheme in order
to judge the meaning in the content’ (Potter & Levine-
Donnerstein, 1999: 259).
The validity of the coding process was checked through
parallel coding of a text sample by all coders. Training of the
coders was continued until coherence was achieved.
Throughout the coding process, disputable cases were
discussed by the team, and respective decisions were
included in the codebook, which include sub-codes and
descriptions of the single codes.3 All fully coded TV reports
were ﬁnally checked by one and the same senior project
researcher.
3. Export pipelines: an overview4
Most of the oil and gas ﬁelds of the Caspian Sea Basin
belong to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. After
the end of the Soviet Union, these newly independent
countries depended entirely on the Soviet pipeline network
to export their energy production.1 Details on these TV stations have been included in a documentation
of the creation of the text corpus, which is available online at http://www.
forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/ﬁle/Pipelines-Caspian_media-
listþcodebook.pdf.
2 This concerns only a small number of cases. A typical example would
be the argument that proﬁts, not geopolitics determine pipeline de-
cisions. In that case, arguments related to geopolitics are presented as not
having explanatory power.
3 A detailed description of all variables and codes is given in the
codebook, which is available online at: http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-
bremen.de/UserFiles/ﬁle/Pipelines-Caspian_media-listþcodebook.pdf.
4 See the contribution by Smith-Stegen and Kusznir in this special
journal issue. For an extensive overview see Heinrich, 2014.As Russia has a central position in the Soviet pipeline
network, it remains a major player in the region. It sees the
Caspian countries' dependence on the old Soviet pipeline
system as a major foreign policy tool to maintain its inﬂu-
ence in the so-called ‘near abroad’. Accordingly, Russia
succeeded in convincing Kazakhstan to build its ﬁrst post-
Soviet oil export pipeline through Russian territory.
However, after years of negotiations and intensive
lobbying by the US government, Azerbaijan built its ﬁrst
post-Soviet oil export pipeline through Georgia to Turkey,
avoiding further exports through Russia. Additionally, the
EU started a broad lobbying effort for a pipeline trans-
porting Caspian gas through Turkey to Central Europe.
These pipeline projects offered Turkey the opportunity to
become amajor energy hub between the East and theWest.
The easiest oil export route from the Caspian Sea,
though, would have been the use of the Iranian pipeline
network with its established port facilities on the Persian
Gulf coast. However, Iranwas sidelined for political reasons,
as US sanctions prevented the involvement of the Western
energy companies that are active in the Caspian oil and gas
consortia. Additionally, Iran's uncooperative behaviour on
the legal status of the Caspian Sea hampered the explora-
tion of resources as well as plans for a trans-Caspian export
pipeline from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to the West.
China, on the other hand, which became the world's
most dynamic importer of energy resources at the end of
the 1990s, has increasingly gained access to the Caspian
region. It has invested heavily in the Kazakh oil and gas
industry and was also the ﬁrst of the major powers to get
involved in gas production in Turkmenistan. As a result, an
oil pipeline and a gas pipeline from Kazakhstan as well as a
gas pipeline from Turkmenistan provide China with
considerable energy supplies. In the case of Turkmenistan,
China has thereby ended the Russian monopoly on gas
exports from that country.
In order to understand pipeline-related decisions, it is
important to distinguish between oil and gas exports. The
major difference relevant for export pipelines from the
Caspian region is that oil can be transported by ship much
easier than gas. Accordingly, for oil exports from a land-
locked region like the Caspian Sea area, one pipeline to a
port with an export terminal is sufﬁcient. Such export ter-
minals are available on the Russian and Georgian Black Sea
coast, on the Turkish coast of theMediterranean Sea and on
the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the trans-
port of oil from the Eastern coast of the Caspian Sea by ship
to export pipelines on the West coast is feasible.
By contrast, for natural gas, transport by ship requires
liquiﬁed natural gas (LNG) terminals, which have very
limited capacities in the Caspian region and add consider-
ably to transportation costs. Thus, the only feasible option
for the transport of gas across the Caspian Sea, in terms of
costs, is a pipeline.
As a large number of speciﬁc pipelines have been pro-
posed in the more than 15 years since the Caspian oil and
gas boom created the need for export opportunities, and as
many of these proposals have been rather short lived, we
have e in a ﬁrst step e grouped the different pipeline
proposals along speciﬁc export routes in line with
geographical directions.
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tential export options to all four geographical directions:
(1) northward through the Soviet pipeline network to
Russia (and from there to export markets) or through
newly built pipelines, (2) eastward to China, (3) southward
either to Iran or through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India
and, ﬁnally, (4) westward through a trans-Caspian pipeline
to be constructed (or via ship transport) to the South
Caucasus and from there to the EU and world markets.
Azerbaijan also has the northern and the western option,
but due to its geographical position on theWest coast of the
Caspian Sea, the southward option is limited to Iran and the
eastward option to China is not feasible.
4. Favoured pipeline projects
In the case of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the boom
started in the late 1990s with oil production, and the ﬁrst
export pipeline requiredwas that for oil. Turkmenistan's oil
production is too small to justify an export pipeline.
In Azerbaijan, the Western export route through Geor-
gia and Turkey clearly dominated TV reporting. It is
mentioned in 85% of all reports on export pipelines. At the
same time only 3% of all reports contain critical assess-
ments of the pipeline. Second follows the Northern option
through Russia which is mentioned in only 7% of all
pipeline-related TV reports, with 10% of these reports
containing criticism of the pipeline.
In Azerbaijan, the overall amount of TV reporting on oil
export pipelines differs over the years, depending on
whether there is current news about a pipeline project, but
the share of reporting on the different export routes re-
mains rather stable. The Western route clearly dominates
in every year from 1998 until 2013, and the Northern route
is always mentioned in a small number of reports between
1999 and 2009.
Overall reporting on oil export pipelines decreases from
over one hundred reports per year in 2005/06 to a mere
handful of reports after 2009. This is a clear indication that
the issue of oil export pipelines was settled for Azerbaijan
with the construction of the BakueTbilisieCeyhan pipeline,
which runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Turkish
Mediterranean Sea port and started operation in 2006.
Kazakhstan's TV stations, contrary to those in
Azerbaijan, covered different export routes rather equally.
The Northern option of exports through Russia, the Eastern
option of exports to China and the Western option of ex-
ports through Azerbaijan's export pipeline were covered
with a share of approximately 30% each, while the Southern
option of exports via Iranwas mentioned in only 10% of the
TV reports about export pipelines. Interestingly, there is
hardly any criticism of pipeline options at all in TV reports
in Kazakhstan. Only the Western route receives some crit-
ical assessments, which can be found in 8% of the respective
reports.
In the case of Kazakhstan, there are substantial changes
over time in the share of different export routes in TV
reporting. From 1998 until 2001, the Northern route
dominated. In 2002 and again in 2006, theWestern route is
mentioned most often, while around 2004 the Eastern
route is most prominently mentioned.This reporting pattern is roughly in line with actual
pipeline projects. The ﬁrst oil export pipeline to be built
was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which runs from
Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port Novorossiysk and
started operation in 2001. The construction of the oil export
pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey offered Kazakhstan the
chance to supply oil exports to the port of Baku. When this
pipeline started operation and in 2008 when Kazakhstan
started to ship oil across the Caspian Sea for export through
the pipeline, theWestern route dominated pipeline-related
TV reports in Kazakhstan. The section of Kazakhstan's oil
export pipeline to China was completed in 2005, with a
corresponding peak in media reporting in 2004/05. Since
2009, the TV coverage of oil export pipelines has been very
low, indicating that the issue has lost relevance.
While Kazakhstan mainly focuses on oil exports,
Turkmenistan e as one of the largest gas producers of the
world e is exclusively interested in gas exports. In
Azerbaijan, gas exports became an issue after a large gas
ﬁeld was discovered, which started production in 2006.
After TV reporting on gas export pipelines started in
Azerbaijan in 2001/02, it has concentrated on the Western
route even more than in the case of oil. The Northern and
Southern options were both mentioned in just 1% of all
pipeline-related TV reports. The major reason seems to be
that the Azerbaijani government swiftly opted to build the
gas export pipeline parallel to the major oil export pipeline
through Georgia toTurkey. Tellingly, not a single criticism is
mentioned in a total of 101 TV reports dealing with this
pipeline. In the following years, the only question
remaining was which of several competing pipeline pro-
jects would be selected for further gas exports to the EU
market. Judging by TV reporting, the Nabucco pipeline was
the clear favourite for Azerbaijan until 2009. It was
mentioned far more often than rival projects. The ﬁrst
criticism was aired in 2009, but positive assessments still
outnumbered critiques four-fold in that year.
Thus, the argument by Ismayilov and others, that ‘Baku
is now keen to have its gas distributed among as many
players in the region as possible, rather than limiting its
exports to a single (western) market’ (Ismayilov, 2010: 4:
see also Ipek, 2009), is not supported by our analysis.
Instead, Azerbaijan has, since the early 2000s, been
completely focused on the Western route.
On Kazakhstan's TV stations, gas export pipelines are
mentioned in less than a ﬁfth of all pipeline-related reports,
as oil dominates pipeline discussions. With its own gas
production being too small for the construction of a major
export pipeline, Kazakhstan has tried to join gas pipeline
projects of neighbouring countries. When the discussion of
gas export pipelines started in 2005, this again resulted in
the consideration of different export directions. The
Eastern direction, which was agreed in 2007 to be part of
the pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, received themost
attention in TV reporting, and not a single criticism was
aired. The other three directions taken together had about
the same share in reporting, with the Northern route being
the second most often mentioned.
While pipeline-related TV reporting in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan devotes the most coverage to those pipelines
that have actually been built, in the case of Turkmenistan,
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Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, received the most
attention; it is mentioned in more than half of all pipeline-
related TV reports. The export route through Russia, which
was already in place at the end of the Soviet Union, is
mentioned only in 20% of the reports. The newly built
pipeline to China, which was commissioned in 2010, has
been covered in TV reporting since 2006. In the following
three years, it is mentionedmore often in TV reporting than
the Southern route. The Western route, namely a Trans-
Caspian pipeline for exports to European markets, was by
far the most prominent option in the late 1990s. However,
since 2001, it has received very limited coverage on Turk-
menistan's state-controlled TV.
Most major pipeline options are not criticized at all on
Turkmenistan TV. In a total of 400 pipeline-related TV re-
ports, there are only 10 examples of negative assessments
of speciﬁc pipeline options. Thus, the degree of positive TV
coverage compared to neutral TV assessments seems to be
a primary indicator of the priorities of Turkmenistan's
ruling elites. Only for the pipeline project through
Afghanistan and Pakistan and for the pipeline to China do
positive assessments clearly outnumber neutral de-
scriptions. In the case of the Soviet-era pipeline through
Russia, there are only 2 positive remarks, 5 points of criti-
cism and 55 neutral references. The Nabucco project is only
once mentioned positively.
In the case of Turkmenistan, TV reporting clearly re-
ﬂects the preferences of the political leadership more than
actual developments. Considering political as well as
geographic conditions, a pipeline through Afghanistan and
Pakistan would be more than challenging. At the same
time, the Western route, actively promoted by the EU and
Western energy companies in the context of the Nabucco
project, has received hardly any attention in Turkmenistan
and is the only major pipeline option being criticized. One
might argue that watching Turkmen TV would have been
enough to understand that linking Turkmenistan to the
Nabucco pipeline was never feasible. It is also telling that
the export pipeline through Russia does not receive posi-
tive coverage.
In summary, the ruling elite of Turkmenistan dreams
about the southern route, does not like the Northern
route, does not take the Western route seriously and
pragmatically opts for the Eastern route. In Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan, however, TV coverage is largely in line
with the progress of actual pipeline construction. In order
to get a better understanding of the public justiﬁcation
for these decisions, we have analyzed the major argu-
ments used.
5. Major arguments
A considerable number of the pipeline-related TV re-
ports do not mention any arguments for or against speciﬁc
pipelines or pipeline routes. One reason is that some re-
ports (or the parts of reports related to export pipelines) are
very short. Another reason is that some reports adopt a
‘factual’ or ‘neutral’ attitude by simply listing technical
details of pipelines. As a result, in all three countries, the
most common argument is present in less than 20% of allpipeline-related TV reports. However, a total of 922 argu-
ments identiﬁed in the coding process allow for some
conclusions.
The most common arguments in relation to export
pipelines refer to geopolitical considerations. In all three
countries, geopolitical arguments can be found in
approximately 15% of all pipeline-related TV reports.
However, the business argument, i.e. the proﬁtability of
the pipeline projects, is mentioned only slightly less in the
three countries under study. If we take a broader view on
foreign policy-related arguments, instead of a more nar-
row focus on geopolitics, the picture changes. In
Azerbaijan, many arguments, named in more than 10% of
all reports, relate to regional politics instead of geopolitics;
they argue for or against speciﬁc pipeline projects with
reference to relations with Armenia, Georgia or Turkey. In
Turkmenistan, political relations with neighbouring states,
namely Iran and also Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are
mentioned as relevant arguments in over 15% of all
pipeline-related TV reports.
Another important argument, next to foreign policy and
proﬁtability, is export diversiﬁcation as an end in itself, i.e.
the argument that one pipeline should be built to prevent
the exporting country from becoming too dependent on
another pipeline. Most often, this argument refers not to
speciﬁc pipeline projects but to overall export directions,
usually implying that an alternative to exports through
Russia is needed. In Kazakhstan, export diversiﬁcation is
mentioned as an argument in 8% of all pipeline-related TV
reports. Export diversiﬁcation also receives attention in
more than 10% of the reports in Turkmenistan. In the case of
Turkmenistan, technical feasibility is also an important
issue, which is mentioned in 11% of all reports.
Interestingly, environmental concerns are not an issue
in pipeline-related TV reports in any of the three countries,
and they are mentioned in no more than 3% of reports in
Azerbaijan and hardly ever in Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan.
Overall, the diversity of arguments being used implies a
pragmatic approach by the ruling elites. What determines
support for speciﬁc pipelines is not geopolitics or proﬁt-
ability alone. Instead, it is a mix of several arguments, with
foreign policy, proﬁtability, export diversiﬁcation and
technical feasibility featuring most prominently. The fact
that preferences for speciﬁc pipelines are based on prag-
matic considerations is also demonstrated by the distri-
bution of arguments among pipeline projects.
One interesting aspect in this context is how the weak
points of speciﬁc pipeline projects are presented. In
Azerbaijan, the only argument made in relation to export
options involving LNG is technical feasibility. As a result,
this option is presented as not desirable due to the chal-
lenges of LNG transport. In Turkmenistan, technical feasi-
bility is mentioned as an argument in relation to the
favoured pipeline project through Afghanistan and
Pakistan. However, it is far outnumbered by arguments
related to foreign policy, proﬁtability and diversiﬁcation. As
a result, the pipeline is presented as challenging but highly
desirable.
Moreover, in Turkmenistan, questions of technical
feasibility are about as often discussed for the other two
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China. Interestingly, geopolitical arguments are very
prominent for all pipelines except those running to Russia.
Out of a total of 67 geopolitical arguments, only 6 refer to
Russia. For the Russian option, technical feasibility and
export diversiﬁcation are the most common arguments on
Turkmenistan TV.
In general, favoured pipeline projects score high in
central arguments. In TV reports on the two major oil
export pipelines built by Kazakhstan, arguments related to
geopolitics, proﬁtability or export diversiﬁcation have a
share of about a third each, while no other argument is
mentioned more than twice.5 The pattern for the oil tanker
link across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan's export pipeline
is similar, with the only difference being that relations with
neighbouring states (i.e., in this case the transit countries)
and the issue of political feasibility get some attention.
In the case of Azerbaijan's major oil export pipeline, the
frequency of the major arguments is twice as high as the
national average. Foreign policy-related arguments have a
share of 48% (with geopolitics accounting for exactly half of
it), while proﬁtability has a share of 18% and socio-
economic development has 10%.6 Here, the logic seems to
be that foreign policy trumps proﬁtability, as the chosen
pipeline was a very expensive project. In order to coun-
terbalance the criticism related to proﬁtability, arguments
related to socio-economic development are introduced,
which highlight the beneﬁts of oil exports without having
to address the costs of speciﬁc pipeline options.7 Although
socio-economic beneﬁts obviously result from all export
pipelines, on Azerbaijan TV this argument is e with just
one single exception e only presented in relation to pipe-
lines which have actually been built.
Interestingly, the oil export pipeline through Russia,
which is a minor export pipeline throughout the period
covered here, has mainly been linked to proﬁtability and
has also received some praise for socio-economic devel-
opment. Export diversiﬁcation and foreign policy are both
mentioned only half as often as proﬁtability. Technical
feasibility, for example, the threat of terrorism in the North
Caucasus, is only seldommentioned.8 Contrary to themajor
oil pipeline, the reasoning here would imply that the
pipeline through Russia is used because of its proﬁtability,
which trumps all the other arguments.
6. Conclusion
A closer look at the positions of the ruling elites of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as aired on TV,
can help to understand these countries priorities con-
cerning export pipelines.
Our analysis clearly identiﬁes the preferred pipeline
options of the ruling elites of the three countries. For both5 Out of a total of 88 coded arguments.
6 Out of a total of 371 coded arguments.
7 Arguments presented in TV reports related to the gas export pipeline
later constructed parallel to the oil pipeline follow exactly the same
pattern.
8 The total number of arguments is much smaller, though, reaching
only 34.oil and gas, Azerbaijan has rejected the Russian option and
prefers the Western direction, focusing on Turkey as an
energy hub more than on direct negotiations with the EU.
Kazakhstan has opted for diversiﬁcation of its oil exports,
hedging its export bets between Russia and China, while
still not explicitly abandoning the option of oil transit
through the South Caucasus. The latter option will become
relevant if Kazakhstan manages to realize the long ex-
pected rise in oil production. Turkmenistan has tried to
move away from gas exports through Russia with the help
of export pipelines to China and to India.
This implies that contrary to the established view in the
literature, over the last decade, Azerbaijan has never
developed a serious interest in alternatives to the Western
route, while Turkmenistan does not consider the Western
route to be a relevant option.
In summary, all pipeline options promoted by the ruling
elites have been realised e with the exception of the
TurkmenistaneAfghanistanePakistaneIndia pipeline.
Moreover, the preferred pipeline options are not simply a
reﬂection of geopolitical pressures. Instead, decision-
makers in these three Caspian states consider a broad
range of arguments. Chief among these considerations are
geopolitical concerns and an interest in proﬁt maximiza-
tion. Additionally, relations with neighbouring states and
export diversiﬁcation play important roles as arguments
related to speciﬁc pipeline projects. The prominence of
diversiﬁcation strategies highlights that the three countries
are not just objects in geopolitical power struggles of more
inﬂuential states.
It is also important to note that ruling elites of the
three Caspian states focus on state-related aspects, such
as foreign policy and state ﬁnances, but do not take a
broader societal perspective in their pipeline decisions.
The socio-economic development that could be achieved
through oil and gas exports is only instrumentally used
as an argument in order to promote the chosen pipeline
option, but is clearly not treated as an end in itself.
Environmental concerns, which sometimes dominate
pipeline debates in Western countries, like in the case of
the North American Keystone XL pipeline, are completely
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